The Living Thing / Notebooks : Cooperation

Selfishness” versus “altruism” in ecology, evolutionary biology, economics, game theory, moral philosophy. Group selection, cancer, eusociality. Possible grounding Genetic, social, individual and other kinds of learning, and their interactions. Levels of selection and inheritance (group/gene/individual/whatever). Ethnic signifiers.

See also altruism, evolution, getting along.

Refs

Alch50
Alchian, A. A.(1950) Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory. The Journal of Political Economy, 58, 211–221.
AlCa13
Algan, Y., & Cahuc, P. (2013) Trust and Growth. Annual Review of Economics, 5(1), 521–549. DOI.
Axel97
Axelrod, R. (1997) The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. . Princeton University Press
AxHa81
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D.(1981) The Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390–1396.
AxHa03
Axelrod, R., & Hammond, R. A.(2003) The evolution of ethnocentric behavior. . Presented at the Midwest Political Science Convention, Chicago, IL
AxHG04
Axelrod, R., Hammond, R. A., & Grafen, A. (2004) Altruism Via Kin-Selection Strategies That Rely on Arbitrary Tags With Which They Coevolve. Evolution, 58(8), 1833–1838. DOI.
BeFF06
Bernhard, H., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2006) Parochial altruism in humans. Nature, 442(7105), 912–915. DOI.
Bowl01
Bowles, S. (2001) Individual interactions, group conflicts, and the evolution of preferences. Social Dynamics, 155, 190.
Bowl04
Bowles, S. (2004) Microeconomics: behavior, institutions, and evolution. . Princeton University Press
Bowl11
Bowles, S. (2011) Is Liberal Society a Parasite on Tradition?. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 39(1), 46–81.
BoCH03
Bowles, S., Choi, J.-K., & Hopfensitz, A. (2003) The co-evolution of individual behaviors and social institutions. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 223(2), 135–147.
BoGi98
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BoGi00
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2000) Reciprocity, Self-Interest and the Welfare State. Nordic Journal of Political Economy, 26, 33–53.
BoGi02
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2002) Social Capital And Community Governance*. The Economic Journal, 112(483), F419–F436. DOI.
BoGi04
Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2004) The evolution of strong reciprocity: cooperation in heterogeneous populations. Theoretical Population Biology, 65(1), 17–28. DOI.
BoRi87
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J.(1987) The Evolution of Ethnic Markers. Cultural Anthropology, 2, 65.
BoRi88
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J.(1988) Culture and the evolutionary process. . Chicago: University of Chicago Press
BoRi90
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BoRi92
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J.(1992) Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology, 13(3), 171–195. DOI.
BoRi99
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J.(1999) Complex Societies: The Evolutionary Origins of a Crude Superorganism. Human Nature, 10, 253.
BrBG07
Brockhurst, M. A., Buckling, A., & Gardner, A. (2007) Cooperation Peaks at Intermediate Disturbance. Current Biology, ??
Brow83
Brown, J. L.(1983) Cooperation—A Biologist’s Dilemma. In R. A. H. Jay S. Rosenblatt Colin Beer and Marie-Claire Busnel (Ed.), Advances in the Study of Behavior (Vol. Volume 13, pp. 1–37). Academic Press
Chon91
Chong, D. (1991) Collective action and the civil rights movement. . Chicago: University of Chicago Press
CrOs95
Crawford, S. E., & Ostrom, E. (1995) A Grammar of Institutions. The American Political Science Review, 89, 582–600.
FeFi03
Fehr, E., & Fischbacher, U. (2003) The nature of human altruism. Nature, 425(6960), 785–791.
FeSc99
Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M.(1999) A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868. DOI.
Gelm08
Gelman, A. (2008) Methodology as ideology: some comments on Robert Axelrod’s The Evolution of Cooperation. QA Rivista dell’Associazione Rossi-Doria, 2.
Gint00
Gintis, H. (2000) Beyond Homo economicus: evidence from experimental economics. Ecological Economics, 35, 311. DOI.
GBBF03
Gintis, H., Bowles, S., Boyd, R., & Fehr, E. (2003) Explaining altruistic behavior in humans. Evolution and Human Behavior, 24(3), 153–172. DOI.
GiSB01
Gintis, H., Smith, E., & Bowles, S. (2001) Costly signaling and cooperation. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 213(1), 103–119. DOI.
Hard71
Hardin, R. (1971) Collective action as an agreeable n-prisoners’ dilemma. Behavioral Science, 16(5), 472–481. DOI.
Hard82
Hardin, R. (1982) Collective action. . Baltimore: Published for Resources for the Future by the Johns Hopkins University Press
Heck96
Heckathorn, D. D.(1996) The Dynamics and Dilemmas of Collective Action. American Sociological Review, 61(2), 250–277. DOI.
HeBo98
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (1998) The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the Emergence of Between-Group Differences. Evolution and Human Behavior, 19(4), 215–241. DOI.
HeBo01
Henrich, J., & Boyd, R. (2001) Why people punish defectors: Weak conformist transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 208(1), 79–89.
HBBC05
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., … Tracer, D. (2005) “Economic Man” in cross-cultural perspective: Behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 28, 795.
HeSo09
Hetzer, M., & Sornette, D. (2009) Other-Regarding Preferences and Altruistic Punishment: A Darwinian Perspective (SSRN Scholarly Paper No. ID 1468517). . Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network
HeSo13a
Hetzer, M., & Sornette, D. (2013a) An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation, Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games. PLoS ONE, 8(11), e77041. DOI.
HeSo13b
Hetzer, M., & Sornette, D. (2013b) The Co-Evolution of Fairness Preferences and Costly Punishment. PLoS ONE, 8(3), e54308. DOI.
Holz03a
Holzinger, K. (2003a) Common goods, matrix games and institutional response. European Journal of International Relations, 9(2), 173–212.
Holz03b
Holzinger, K. (2003b) The Problems of Collective Action: A New Approach. . Preprints aus der Max-Planck-Projektgruppe Recht der Gemeinschaftsgüter
LeBo07
Le, S., & Boyd, R. (2007) Evolutionary dynamics of the continuous iterated Prisoner’s dilemma. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 245, 258–267.
Mora06
Moral Sentiments and Material Interests: The Foundations of Cooperation in Economic Life. (2006). The MIT Press
Offe02
Offer, A. (2002) Why has the Public Sector Grown so Large in Market Societies? The Political Economy of Prudence in the UK, c 1870-2000 (Working Paper No. 44). . Oxford University Department of Economics
Offe12
Offer, A. (2012) The Economy of Obligation: Incomplete Contracts and the Cost of the Welfare State (Working Paper No. 103). . Oxford University Department of Economics
Olso09
Olson, M. (2009) The logic of collective action: public goods and the theory of groups. (Vol. 124). Harvard University Press
Ostr90
Ostrom, E. (1990) Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions). . Cambridge University Press
Ostr92
Ostrom, E. (1992) The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common Property Institutions. Making the Commons Work: Theory, Practice and Policy.
Ostr98
Ostrom, E. (1998) A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action. The American Political Science Review, 92, 1–22. DOI.
Ostr00
Ostrom, E. (2000) Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 14, 137–158. DOI.
Ostr02
Ostrom, E. (2002) Social capital: a fad or a fundamental concept?. In Social Capital: A Multifaceted Perspective. World Bank Publications
OBFN99
Ostrom, E., Burger, J., Field, C. B., Norgaard, R. B., & Policansky, D. (1999) Revisiting the Commons: Local Lessons, Global Challenges. Science, 284, 278–282. DOI.
RiBH03
Richerson, P. J., Boyd, R. T., & Henrich, J. (2003) Cultural Evolution of Human Cooperation. Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation, 357.
RiCA01
Riolo, R. L., Cohen, M. D., & Axelrod, R. (2001) Evolution of cooperation without reciprocity. Nature, 414(6862), 441. DOI.
ScOs92
Schlager, E., & Ostrom, E. (1992) Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A Conceptual Analysis. Land Economics, 68, 249–262. DOI.
Seke12
Sekeris, P. G.(2012) The Tragedy of the Commons in a Violent World (Working Paper No. 1213). . University of Namur, Department of Economics