On unorthodox ways to get capital-intensive risking things done. Weird stakeholder models. Worker owned firms. Der Mittelstand. Capitalism’s end game. Mechanism design, Should probably include Prediction market and/or mechanism design angles.
For descriptive stuff, see Finance, descriptives. For actual strategies in already-existing markets, portfolio theory.
Worker-owned firms and other profit share models
…the emergence of worker-owned apps, where they own and run the marketplace themselves. It’s a trend that could save the gig economy from itself.
Interesting illustration of the way things differ depending on who owns whom: the wobblies write about worker exploitation at consumer-owned cooperatives.
Other financey things
We’ve worked with the team at Cooley to create an investment instrument that has elements of both debt and equity. Debt in that we will not be purchasing equity initially, but, unlike debt, there is no maturity date, no collateralization of assets and no recourse if it’s never paid back. The equity element will only become a factor if the participating company chooses to raise a round of financing or sell out to an acquiring company. We don’t have a clever acronym or name for this instrument yet, but I’m sure we’ll come up with something great.
This instrument gives us a lot more flexibility to work with different types of companies than the Delaware C-Corps most commonly funded by VCs. It also facilitates the two elements of the indie.vc terms that were most important to us and to founders: cash distributions and contingent equity conversion.
equitise: Equity crowdfunding for private companies in Australia/NZ. I kind of like that this exists but also… why would you rationally take on the higher risk of non-listed firms? There are other operators locally in IPOs at least.
Lend for Good:
A platform through which the crowd can lend money to growing businesses that are delivering impact.[…]
Impact SMEs post deals for the capital they need to the crowd.
Lenders in the crowd choose the deals they support because of the business, the terms and the impact.
Borrowers chase their business and impact goals, and repay their lenders an agreed interest rate after an agreed time frame.
Stross, C. (2014). Neptune’s brood: a space opera.
Immortal robots battle over interstellar investment capital.
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Palladino, Lenore. 2019. “RIP Shareholder Primacy.” Text. Boston Review. August 21, 2019. http://bostonreview.net/class-inequality/lenore-palladino-rip-shareholder-primacy.
Rajan, Raghuram G., and Luigi Zingales. 2000. “The Governance of the New Enterprise.” Working Paper 7958. National Bureau of Economic Research. http://www.nber.org/papers/w7958.
———. 1998. “Power in a Theory of the Firm.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 113 (2): 387–432. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355398555630.
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