The Living Thing / Notebooks :

Free will

A matter about which I voluntarily admit I don’t care, but feel constrained to have something to link to when eliding

Usefulness: 🔧
Novelty: 💡
Uncertainty: 🤪 🤪 🤪
Incompleteness: 🚧 🚧 🚧

The unsatisfying semantic debate that few feel the need to have the correct vocabulary for, but many feel the need to have opinions on. If you are a philosopher of these things, you can move on. I have nothing to add for you.

Me, I don’t know what “free will” is, but I know what it isn’t when I see it.

I had a long argument with a drunk gentleman over dinner the other night. He was arguing that free will does not exist. I was arguing that his statement “free will does not exist” has no empirical content. Naturally, we did not come to an accommodation. I think he took me for a fool in thrall to hopeless idealism about the human soul, and I took him for someone belatedly complaining about the consistency of 1st century metaphysics when scrutinized through a 17th century lense.

This kind of tedious dinner table maundering can be confused for debates about Monism/Dualism in poor lighting conditions.

Scenes from a Multiverse Free will is the freedom to choose to obey an arcane laundry list of bronze-age laws under threat of immolation. Free will helps us appreciate just how wonderful it is to not be on fire.

Lou Keep rants at slightly too much length:

the question isn’t actually asking what it *thinks* it’s asking…
humans are rocks, which is why we have reason and free will.

Schopenhauer: Spinoza (Epist. 62) says that if a stone projected through the
air had consciousness, it would imagine it was flying of its own will. I add
merely that the stone would be right.

So, you know, nice quotes.

It gets interesting when we watch justice and responsibility collide. This is, IMO, the bit of “free will” I would like to have drunkenly explained to me over dinner. Dan Hirschman recommends:

Check out the article for more, including Brandmayr’s analysis of how social
scientific invocations of free-will vs. institutional constraint are
themselves shaped by their positions in an antagonistic process. But mostly
just check it out for the strange feeling of reading cultural anthropology
and neuropsychology fight over whether seven scientists are culpable for the
deaths of 306 earthquake victims.

Anyway, I don’t feel that any of these really models as far as I can tell really cleave reality at the joints. Slightly more natural to my mind is Scott Aaronson’ssetup where he argues that while some freewilleteers concern themselves with determinism when a more useful notion might be predictability. Maybe this is more relevant?