See also institution, standards, Red Queen Signalling, surveillance society.
Anders Sandberg, on AI-versus social norm enforcemant:
We are subject to norm enforcement from friends and strangers all the time. What is new is the application of media and automation. They scale up the stakes and add the possibility of automated enforcement[…]. Automated enforcement makes the panopticon effect far stronger: instead of suspecting a possibility of being observed it is a near certainty. So the net effect is stronger, more pervasive norm enforcement…
…of norms that can be observed and accurately assessed. Jaywalking is transparent in a way being rude or selfish often isn’t. We may end up in a situation where we carefully obey some norms, not because they are the most important but because they can be monitored.
Axelrod, Robert. 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation: Agent-Based Models of Competition and Collaboration. Princeton University Press.
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Crawford, Sue E, and Elinor Ostrom. 1995. “A Grammar of Institutions.” The American Political Science Review 89: 582–600.
David, P A. 1998. “Communication Norms and the Collective Cognitive Performance of ‘Invisible Colleges’.” In Creation and Transfer of Knowledge: Institutions and Incentives, 115–63. Springer Berlin Heidelberg. http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-662-03738-6_7.
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Epstein, Joshua M. 2001. “Learning to Be Thoughtless: Social Norms and Individual Computation.” Computational Economics 18: 9–24. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1013810410243.
Gintis, Herbert, Eric Smith, and Samuel Bowles. 2001. “Costly Signaling and Cooperation.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 213 (1): 103–19. https://doi.org/10.1006/jtbi.2001.2406.
Hetzer, Moritz, and Didier Sornette. 2013. “An Evolutionary Model of Cooperation, Fairness and Altruistic Punishment in Public Good Games.” PLoS ONE 8 (11): e77041. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0077041.
Knight, Jack, and Itai Sened. 1998. Explaining Social Institutions. University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, Elinor. 2000. “Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives 14: 137–58. https://doi.org/10.2307/2646923.
Postlewaite, Andrew. 2011. “Social Norms and Social Assets.” Annual Review of Economics 3 (1): 239–59. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-061109-080158.
Sethi, Rajiv, and Somanathan. 1996. “The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use.” The American Economic Review 86: 766–88. https://doi.org/10.2307/2118304.
Young, H. Peyton. 2015. “The Evolution of Social Norms.” Annual Review of Economics 7 (1): 359–87. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-080614-115322.
Young, H Peyton. 1998. “Social Norms and Economic Welfare.” European Economic Review 42 (3): 821–30.